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Is there still a place for the concept of ‘therapeutic 
regression’ in psychoanalysis? 
Laurence S. Spurling 
 
 
The author uses his own failure to find a place for the idea of therapeutic regression in his 
clinical thinking or practice as the basis for an investigation into its meaning and usefulness. 
He makes a distinction between three ways the term ‘regression’ is used in psychoanalytic 
discourse: as a way of evoking a primitive level of experience; as a reminder in some clin- 
ical situations of the value of non-intervention on the part of the analyst; and as a descrip- 
tion of a phase of an analytic treatment with some patients where the analyst needs to put 
aside normal analytic technique in order to foster a regression in the patient. It is this third 
meaning, which the author terms ‘‘therapeutic regression’’ that this paper examines, prin- 
cipally by means of an extended discussion of two clinical examples of a patient making a 
so-called therapeutic regression, one given by Winnicott and the other by Masud Khan. 
The author argues that in these examples the introduction of the concept of therapeutic 
regression obscures rather than clarifies the clinical process. He concludes that, as a sub- 
stantial clinical concept, the idea of therapeutic regression has outlived its usefulness. How- 
ever he also notes that many psychoanalytic writers continue to find a use for the more 
generic concept of regression, and that the very engagement with the more particular idea 
of therapeutic regression has value in provoking questions as to what is truly therapeutic in 
psychoanalytic treatment. 
Introduction 
One of the more enduring ideas in psychoanalysis is that of some patients needing a 
period of regression during their treatment, and that such a regression can only be 
allowed by the analyst putting aside their normal analytic technique. To meet this 
therapeutic regression in the patient, so the argument runs, analysts must learn to 
give up on their normal expectation that the patient put their thoughts and feelings 
into words. Instead the analyst should convey to the patient that what is required is 
‘‘an ordinary abandonment … of reporting and thinking oneself out’’ (Bollas, 1987, 
p. 259). What counts here is not facility with interpretation, even interpretations spe- 
cifically designed to appeal to the patient who is hard to reach. A different kind of 
attention to the regressed patient is required, one based on the qualities of ‘‘reception, 
musing and evocation’’ (Bollas, 1987, p. 273). Such an attitude invokes what Michael 
Balint called an object-relation based on the structure of a primary object, ‘‘an envi- 
ronment that accepts and consents to sustain and carry the patient like the earth or 
water sustains and carries a man who entrusts his weight to it’’ (Balint, 1968, p. 45). 
Winnicott preferred the model for the analyst to be that of the mother who ‘holds’ an 
infant totally dependent on her care and attention in order to survive and to flourish. 
 As someone who has drawn inspiration from Winnicott’s work (Spurling, 2003), 
I have long been fascinated by these ideas on therapeutic regression. I have found 
them a welcome reminder of the inescapably aesthetic and intuitive aspects of the 
analytic attitude. However, I have also struggled to turn the concept of therapeutic 
regression into a meaningful idea, and been unable to find a place for it in my 
clinical thinking. The problem was that my patients just did not seem to regress in 
the ways described in the literature. To be sure, as they became engaged in their 
treatment they became dependent and vulnerable, sometimes intensely so, and with 
some patients there were times in the work when all that seemed to matter was 
whether or not I was able to adapt sufficiently to their needs. But such clinical 
situations, familiar to all practitioners, did not form themselves in my mind into a 
discernible phase of therapeutic regression. Nor did they seem to demand from me 
a different kind of analytic sensitivity over and above my attempts to embody my 
normal way of working. 
At first I put this down to lack of experience and confidence on my part. After 
all, Winnicott advised those in the first decade of their analytic career not to give 
up the ‘‘principles of ordinary practice’’ in taking on patients needing a regression 
(1954a, p. 293). But becoming more clinically experienced and confident, especially 
in working with more disturbed patients in more intensive and extended treatments 
(e.g. Spurling, 2005), did not bring the expected insight into my patients’ hitherto 
unrecognized need to make a therapeutic regression. On the contrary, this only 
seemed to confirm that the idea of my patients making a therapeutic regression 
had become redundant to me. 
In trying to make sense of this apparent failure on my part to find value in the 
concept, I went back to the literature. But now I found that the harder I looked to 
discover what therapeutic regression really meant, and how to recognize it, the less 
I was able to see it. Either the phenomena being described – the patient getting in 
touch with bodily or pre-symbolic experiences or feelings, the patient finding a need 
for silence as a prelude to thinking or feeling, etc. – did not seem to me to be very 
different from the normal things that patients do in treatment, and did not warrant 
the use of a special term. Or the writer seemed to be describing a connection with 
the patient that went beyond the intensely felt transference experiences which arise 
in therapy or analysis, claming to bring about a different order of experience for 
the patient only available to the patient fortunate enough to be working with an 
analyst who believed in the value of therapeutic regression. 
Looking at contemporary accounts in the analytic literature, I think that my fail- 
ure to engage with the idea of therapeutic regression reflects a general unease in 
the psychoanalytic community with the whole idea of regression. A good illustra- 
tion of this is the change in tone between a 1958 and a 1999 report of a panel dis- 
cussion on regression in the Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association. 
The 1958 panel was called on to discuss ‘technical aspects of regression during 
psychoanalysis’, and the report describes the panel as having discussed ‘‘two prob- 
lems of psychoanalytic treatment: how to handle too little regression and how to 
handle too much regression’’ (Calder, 1958, p. 554). In the 1999 panel the topic for 
the panel had become ‘regression: essential clinical condition or iatrogenic phenom- 
enon?’, with the panel called on to consider whether analysts ‘‘view regression as 
indispensable, incidental or inimical to analytic work?’’ (Goldberg, 1999, p. 1168). 
In the 1958 panel it seemed to have been assumed that regression was a beneficial 
 part of analytic therapy, the only question being how to gauge the optimum 
amount of regression in the patient in order for the treatment to do well. But by 
1999 the panellists’ attitude towards regression was no longer so positive, express- 
ing doubt about its effectiveness and concern about whether it might do more harm 
than good. 
How is the concept of regression used in psychoanalytic writing? 
A major difficulty in trying to write about the concept of regression in psycho- 
analysis is that it is used in very different ways. Its most basic meaning is as a 
purely descriptive term, applied to a psychical process having a determinate course 
or evolution (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 386). This use of the concept of 
regression goes back to Freud who used the concept in two main senses: firstly in a 
spatial or topographical sense, to describe the way in the psychical apparatus that 
excitations, represented by wishes or impulses can retrace a pathway which has 
already been established. In a progressive direction this pathway leads from the per- 
ceptual apparatus towards expression as thoughts. In a regression, the movement 
would be in the reverse direction, with thoughts being transformed back into 
images, and then, in a further movement, backwards into dreams or hallucinations 
(Jackson, 1969, p. 773). 
Freud continued to use regression in a topographical sense throughout his writ- 
ings. But he increasingly used regression in another way, a temporal sense, meaning 
a return, usually in the form of a fixation, to an earlier stage of development. 
Freud also made reference to a third meaning of regression, which he called formal 
regression, with the sense of a backwards movements not to a stage but to a less 
developed function or structure, as in a movement from secondary to primary pro- 
cess thinking. 
Freud saw the manifestation of a regression in analysis as a mark of resis- 
tance, a defence against remembering and working through: ‘‘I do not know of 
a passage in Freud’s writings which dealt at any length with the problems of 
therapeutic, not of defensive or pathogenic, regression’’ (Balint, 1968, p. 123). 
This is the way regression continues to be widely used in the psychoanalytic 
literature, to denote a retreat from development in the face of anxiety or con- 
flict. Nevertheless Freud also recognized that if there is no regression on the 
part of the patient, and therefore no access to primary process thinking and 
primitive experiences, there can be no analysis. So as well as being wary of 
regression in the patient, the analyst needs at the same time to be able to allow 
its development, to be able, as Sandler and Sandler put it in their review of the 
concept, to tolerate in the patient ‘‘the perverse, the silly, the stupid, the infan- 
tile and the ridiculous’’ (Sandler and Sandler, 1984, p. 433). 
This dual ambiguity – over what manner of regression is meant, and over 
whether regression in the patient is a sign of resistance or of development – has led 
to a situation where ‘‘we do not have a very precise psychoanalytic definition of the 
concept as it is currently employed’’ (Sandler and Sandler, 1984, p. 431). Further- 
more it is used in different ways in analytic discourse, to do different things, and it 
is helpful to distinguish what these are. 
 
 1. ‘Regression’ as an evocation of the primitive 
Laplanche and Pontalis (1988) begin their definition of regression by remarking 
that it is a term often ‘evoked’ in psychoanalytic writing. I think to speak of an 
evocation here is precisely the right word, as much of the time this is how the term 
functions, to convey the arrival of something primitive in the treatment, whether it 
be a level of development, of experience or part of the mind in the patient, or a 
primitive form of relationship between patient and therapist. 
2. ‘Regression’ as a call for non-intervention 
To describe a psychical process as regressive, or a patient as regressed, does not in 
itself have any particular consequences for one’s clinical thinking, beyond noting 
the emergence of something more primitive. However, there is a tradition of 
thought within psychoanalysis, starting with Ferenczi’s ‘‘principle of relaxation’’ 
(Balint, 1968, p. 151) and then re-surfacing with the work of Balint and Winnicott, 
and in the work of Kris and others in the USA which argues that there is a bias in 
psychoanalytic thinking towards seeing regression in its pathological rather than its 
therapeutic sense, and that this bias is a result of an over-valuation of interpreta- 
tion or more active interventions with the patient. This can be illustrated by some 
comments made by Harold Stewart (1992), in the course of illustrating ‘therapeutic 
regression’ as an agent of psychic change, about a case example given by Hanna 
Segal. 
Segal writes of a patient who during the course of his analysis became increas- 
ingly aware of his obsession with women’s breasts. Following a dream in which 
a woman is giving her breast to a baby, the patient complains to his analyst that 
now all he can think about is her breasts, and tells her that, as a child, he was 
always sucking something. Segal points out to him that, while he has been talking, 
he has been getting ‘‘more and more dreamy and remote’’, and goes on to remind 
him that in his dream the woman who gave the baby her breasts went on to leave 
him. The patient interrupts her angrily, saying: ‘‘Don’t make me think, I don’t 
want to think. I want to suck. I hate thoughts. When I have thoughts, it means I 
have nothing to suck’’ (Segal, 1986, pp. 222–3). Segal uses this example to illustrate 
what she calls the ‘‘hatred of thought processes’’ in the patient, that he experienced 
her interpretation as shattering his illusion of the breast as an ideal object. 
Stewart comments that Segal’s intervention was perfectly correct, but that: 
Something different might have been done at this point in the session when the patient began 
to get dreamy and remote. Instead of making an interpretation, no matter how correct it 
was, the analyst might have remained still and silent to allow the patient to reach and 
explore for himself the experience of being in this state in the presence of an analyst who is 
not intervening with an interpretation, since this is experienced as a request for thinking 
about something instead of simply experiencing. 
(Stewart, 1992, p. 133) 
Stewart’s comments can be taken as offering a different reading of the clinical 
material, one in which the patient’s dreamy and remote state is taken as a sign that 
he is in touch with a primitive state of mind, wanting to suck. Instead of a way of 
avoiding something, this is taken as a prelude towards some form of self-experience, 
what Winnicott called ‘a regression to dependence’, or what Balint called 
 an experience of life having become ‘‘simpler and truer’’ (Balint, 1968, p. 135). 
Here the patient’s ‘non-communication’ would be seen as a ‘positive contribution’ 
(Winnicott, 1963a), needing an attitude on the part of the analyst which would 
allow him to complete an experience. An analogy here would be with the infants 
and children in Winnicott’s spatula game, who needed a ‘period of hesitation’ 
before they were ready to reach for and play with the shiny spatula on the table in 
front of them in order to overcome their anxiety, and so as a necessary step before 
they could go on to experience pleasure and self-mastery (Winnicott, 1941). 
To describe the patient’s state of mind here as regressed (Stewart does not actu- 
ally refer to the patient as ‘regressed’, but it is clear that this is what he means to 
indicate) is not only to point to the emergence of something primitive in the 
patient, but also to say that this emergence is dependent upon the analyst recogniz- 
ing this clinical event as a regression, and being prepared to find a form of clinical 
intervention which allows this regressive development rather than spoils or short- 
circuits it. The most appropriate kind of response, as the example illustrates, is one 
of non-intervention by the analyst, that is, an active refraining from intervention in 
order to give the patient’s self-experience sufficient time and space to unfold. 
For instance, Bollas, in describing his work with a patient who from time to time 
would fall asleep or remain silent for long periods, refers to his non-intervening 
attitude as a way of ‘‘defending the patient’s right to an experience’’, a right in 
danger of being violated by any form of analytic interventionist technique at this 
point (Bollas, 1987, p. 268). 
Where the analyst decides that some form of intervention might be appropriate, 
it should embody an attitude which Balint described as being ‘unobtrusive’, which 
means not becoming too separate, or too much of a sharply-contoured object. 
Stewart argues, for instance, that, when working with a patient who is regressed, 
transference interpretations are to be avoided as these would establish the analyst 
as both separate and omnipotent (Stewart, 1992, p. 117) – precisely his critique of 
the position adopted by Segal in this example. 
If, following this way of thinking, one were to imagine an analyst deciding that 
some form of interpretation, other than a transference interpretation, should be 
made to Segal’s patient, it would be likely to be one which endorsed the way the 
patient was trying to make use of the analyst and the setting of the analysis, per- 
haps represented by the analyst’s breasts, to gain access to his self-experience. 
In other words, the emphasis would be on the interpretation conveying a sense of 
the holding function of the therapist rather than on giving understanding. 
An example of this would be that of Winnicott (1954b) in his paper Withdrawal 
and regression, where he made a series of interpretations to a deeply schizoid 
patient which helped the patient recognize the development in himself of a capacity 
for spontaneity through a dawning trust in the analytic setting. 
3. ‘Regression’ as a therapeutic phase of treatment to be fostered by 
putting aside ordinary analytic technique 
The idea of regression as a call for non-intervention, as in Stewart’s critique of 
Segal, turns on the reading of a particular clinical event – is it an example of path- 
ological dissociation or of developing self-experience? – and the consequent choice 
of clinical intervention – interpretation or silence? What is not in dispute is the 
 overall aim of the analysis at this point, which is to reach or contain the patient 
using the techniques of ordinary analysis. 
However, the term regression can also used in a more radical sense, to designate 
not a disagreement over whether a particular intervention is appropriate or not, but 
to argue that normal analytic technique itself may be inappropriate when working 
with some regressed patients. The critique of Segal here would not be that she chose 
the wrong intervention, but that the very assumptions of her clinical thinking pre- 
vented her from recognizing that her patient was in a regressed state, and so 
(unwittingly) represented a violation of what Winnicott called the patient’s process, 
‘‘that which in each patient has its own pace and which follows its own course 
(1954a, p. 278). In this view, sometimes, particularly when the patient becomes 
severely regressed, protecting the patient’s process from impingement becomes the 
paramount aim of analysis. The problem with normal analytic technique, however, 
is that it mistakes the patient’s trying to convey to the analyst what he or she needs 
for a demand that the analyst gratify their desire: 
It is proper to speak of the patient’s wishes, the wish (for instance) to be quiet. With the 
regressed patient the word wish is incorrect; instead we use the word need. If a regressed 
patient needs quiet, then without it nothing can be done at all. 
(Winnicott, 1954a, p. 288) 
Following the patient’s process to its more primitive levels in a therapeutic regres- 
sion may mean that the analyst needs to do something ‘‘in addition to – but not 
instead of – what happens in a ‘classical’ analytic treatment’’ (Balint, 1968, p. 128, 
italics added). Or it may involve doing something instead of what the analyst would 
normally do, as Winnicott advised in the treatment of patients who were making a 
‘sustained regression’ – ‘‘sometimes over long periods with these patients ordinary 
analytic work has to be in abeyance’’ (Winnicott, 1954a, p. 279). Bollas develops 
this idea a little further by distinguishing between two types of transference experi- 
ence. In ordinary analytic work the analyst strives to foster a normal transference 
relationship, which ‘‘involves the analysand and analyst in the patient’s evolved 
projective and introjective activities lived out in the analytic relationship’’ (Bollas, 
1987, p. 247). But in periods when the patient is regressed, Bollas sees it as his task 
to foster a different class of transference experience, one that involves him as a 
‘‘transformational object’’, in which he is engaged by the patient as ‘‘an auxiliary 
to the process of knowing the self’’ (ibid.). Analysts whose technique does not 
allow them to be used by their patients in this way will never enable their patients 
to reach these depths of self-experience (Bollas, 1987, p. 261; Tuttman, 1979). 
It is regression in this sense that I am referring to as therapeutic regression. 
It comprises two ideas. The first is that some patients, in order to reach levels of 
self-experience, need a period of sustained regression in their treatment. The second 
is that, with some patients, it may not be sufficient to allow their regression; it may 
need to be more actively fostered by the analyst. In order to do so, the analyst 
must be prepared to supplement or replace ordinary analytic technique with a dif- 
ferent way of working. 
The form of regression indicated in this sense of therapeutic regression has been 
described by different authors in various ways. It is usually characterized as a 
formal regression, regression to more primitive forms of behaving and experiencing 
(Balint, 1968, p.130). Regression also seems to have a topographical dimension, 
 with the idea of getting in touch with a distinct area of the mind or personality: 
the area of the ‘basic fault’ (Balint), or the ‘true self’ (Winnicott), or creative part 
of the mind (Kris). When it comes to regression in its temporal sense, the picture is 
less clear. This kind of regression, for example, does not figure in Abram’s defini- 
tion of what Winnicott meant by regression (Abram, 1996), which she defines as a 
formal regression to a state of dependence. But it is hard to think of regression 
without some idea of a return to an earlier state. Indeed Winnicott’s writings are 
shot through with his idea that his regressed patients were actually re-living aspects 
of previous traumatic experiences in the sessions with him, such as a difficult birth 
experience (Winnicott, 1949, p. 249): ‘‘whereas in the transference neurosis the past 
comes into the consulting-room, in this work it is more true to say that the present 
goes back into the past, and is the past (Winnicott, 1955, pp. 297–8). 
These ambiguities as to the precise form of regression are not taken as decisive, 
however, as the emphasis in the writing on therapeutic regression is that it is a 
regression within the analytic relationship itself. It is a return to the infantile state of 
dependence on the setting (Winnicott), or of a harmonious mix-up between analyst 
and patient (Balint). The important point about this relationship is that it is seen 
as exclusively two-person, on the model of nurturing mother and dependent infant, 
with the analyst / mother’s job to protect the infant / patient from unnecessary 
impingements: ‘‘any third party interfering with this relationship is experienced as a 
heavy burden or as an intolerable strain’’ (Balint, 1968, p. 17). 
The point of the patient making a therapeutic regression during treatment is that 
it then becomes the basis for what Balint called ‘a new beginning’. For Winnicott a 
regression could serve as a mobilization of hope: 
an unconscious assumption (which can become a conscious hope) that what when wrong in 
the past – where the environment failed to hold or protect the person – may be re-experi- 
enced, with the individual in a regressed state, but now in an environment which is making 
adequate provision. 
(Winnicott, 1954a, p. 282) 
What is the ‘something’ that needs to be added to or to replace 
normal analytic technique in a therapeutic regression? 
A major problem in trying to understand what is actually meant by the idea of a 
therapeutic regression, and particularly its claim that normal analytic technique 
needs to be superseded in some way, is that there exist few accounts in the litera- 
ture which are both clearly about a regression used in this sense (and not simply an 
evocation of the primitive or a call for non-intervention), and also detailed enough 
to convey what is actually involved (Margaret Little [1985] makes this point). 
The most widely known ways in which advocates of therapeutic regression went 
beyond normal technique are also the most controversial, as they consisted of mak- 
ing changes to the normal parameters of analytic treatment. Balint allowed his 
regressed patients to telephone him out of session times, and allowed finger- and 
hand-holding, arguing that often some form of physical contact was ‘‘always vitally 
important for the progress of the treatment’’ (1968, p. 145). Winnicott sometimes 
gave longer sessions, and would hold the hand or head of regressed patients, as 
Margaret Little describes: ‘‘literally, through many long hours, he held my two 
 hands clasped between his, almost like an umbilical cord’’ (Little, 1985, p. 21). 
The danger of this approach ending up with the analyst commiting serious 
boundary violations is now widely recognized (e.g. Gabbard, 2003), and the modern 
view of those who believe in the value of therapeutic regression would be that 
Balint and Winnicott did not pay sufficient attention to the capacity of the patient 
to manage such modifications to the treatment setting (Stewart, 1992, p. 119; 
White, 2006a). 
But beyond an emphasis on flexibility in the maintenance of therapeutic bound- 
aries with regressed patients, it is not easy to gain a sense of what the analyst actu- 
ally does with a patient supposedly going through a period of therapeutic 
regression. The clearest picture I have got of what Winnicott might have meant 
comes from a paper based on his notes from a seminar he gave to trainees at the 
Institute of Psychoanalysis, where he seemed to have felt he could speak with more 
candour about his work. 
In this paper Winnicott describes a session with a patient he describes as deeply 
regressed, whose dependence on the therapy has become so great that she is ‘‘past 
the point of no return’’ (1964, p. 98). With a patient in such a deeply regressed 
state, not only are the utter reliability and predictability of the setting of overriding 
importance, but also the analyst’s ability to adapt the environmental provision to 
the particular needs of the patient: 
In regard to this patient there are certain things that have to be the same always. The cur- 
tains are drawn; the door is on the latch so that the patient can come straight in; all the 
arrangements in the room must be constant and also there are some objects which are vari- 
able but which belong to the transference relationship. At the time I am describing, the con- 
stant object is placed in a certain position on the desk and there are certain papers which 
have accumulated which I put beside me waiting for the moment when the patient will want 
them back. 
(Winnicott, 1964, p. 98) 
However at the particular session Winnicott is describing, ‘‘in spite of careful 
inspection of my arrangements of the room’’, something goes wrong, the papers 
have been left on top of instead of beside the other object. The patient enters the 
room and discovers the alterations, and, when Winnicott himself enters the room, 
‘‘I find that this is a complete disaster … I know that I shall be lucky if we recover 
from this disaster in a matter of weeks’’ (p. 99). 
Indeed at first the patient reacts in an ‘extreme fashion’, but on this occasion she 
is able to recover and is eventually able to ask herself what is it she has done that 
has caused Winnicott to act in this way? Winnicott tells her that, as far as he can 
see, this ‘disastrous mistake’ on his part had unconscious motivation. He points out 
to the patient that she would have much preferred to see what he had done as a reac- 
tion to something in herself, as that would bring the whole thing under her control. 
Instead she must face the possibility that what happened was nothing to do with her. 
From this the patient took the matter back to certain things about her father, which 
she had always tried to explain as his reactions to something about her, whereas she 
now realized that they were characteristics of her father, nothing to do with her. At 
the end of the session, Winnicott says to the patient that this is what he is like, that 
he is someone who can act with unconscious motivation, and, if she continues in 
analysis with him, he will no doubt do similar things again. 
 What to my mind is well illustrated in this example is Winnicott’s interpretive 
skill when under pressure. He helps the patient recover from her ‘extreme reaction’ 
following his mishandling of the set-up, and then speaks to her in a way which 
helps her see how she deals with trauma by omnipotence, that is, casting herself as 
the cause of Winnicott’s mistake, just as, she is able to realize, she would hold her- 
self responsible for her father’s illness. In fact I would think of Winnicott’s style 
here as an idiosyncratic version of Steiner’s ‘analyst-centred interpretations’ 
(Steiner, 1993), that is, interpretations aimed at facilitating the patient’s experience 
of being understood by focusing on her experience of the analyst, in order to 
anchor her sufficiently in the session to come to her own (patient-centred) under- 
standing. It could be argued that it was Winnicott's particular way of speaking to 
his patient which represented what was really radical about his approach, a way of 
gathering the transference so that the patient could then make use of the session. 
But this is not how Winnicott sees it. The point for him of the case was to give 
an instance of ‘regression to dependence’, of what might happen if ordinary ana- 
lytic technique is left to one side, and to see what might then emerge if the patient 
is allowed a full regression. The implicit argument is that the security and continu- 
ity established by the particular environmental provision allowed by Winnicott, the 
objects in their special place etc., allowed this patient sufficient trust in the environ- 
ment in order eventually to be able to make use of Winnicott’s interventions. 
What does come over is how far Winnicott was prepared to go in adapting the 
setting to his understanding of the needs of the patient. Nevertheless it is not clear 
whether this in itself represents a departure from normal or accepted practice, as 
all practitioners learn to apply treatment boundaries flexibly with each patient. 
What makes it so difficult to make a judgement here is that Winnicott does not 
seem to consider it important to tell his students why he considered this particular 
arrangement essential in order to allow the regression by the patient, how it came 
to be adopted, how it was negotiated, and what he considers some of the conse- 
quences might be of making these changes. Instead he makes a direct appeal to his 
authority: 
In the kind of case I am talking about it is never a question of giving satisfactions in the 
ordinary manner of succumbing to a seduction. It is always that if one provides certain con- 
ditions work can be done and if one does not provide these conditions work cannot be done 
and one might as well not try. 
(Winnicott, 1964, p. 97) 
What is insistent here is this conception of what the patient needs, a consideration 
which overrides all other determinants. The analyst seems to see himself under pres- 
sure to prove to the patient that he is sufficiently reliable for her to trust him, as 
with a patient he describes in another context, who emerged from a session in 
which Winnicott remained as still and silent as he could by telling him: ‘‘Now I 
know you can do my analysis’’ (1954a, p. 290). 
In my view a serious consequence of employing the idea of therapeutic regression 
is that it turns the analyst’s attention away from the transference considerations 
which are part of normal analytic technique – the self-examination which is a con- 
sequence of thinking in terms of the ‘normal counter-transference and its devi- 
ations’ (Money-Kyrle, 1988) – instead keeping the focus on what stops the analyst 
from making even further adaptations to meet the so-called needs of the patient. 
 The astonishing thing is that if one has a patient going through one of these phases one can 
adapt in a very detailed way to the patient ’s needs over a period of time … in time, however, 
one’s own unreliability begins to seep through, and one of the dangers is that, as soon as the 
patient begins to get better in the sense of being able to allow one to lessen vigilance, one is 
liable to take a holiday, so to speak, and to rush forward with a show of one’s own impulse. 
One cannot be blamed for being like this but it may lose a case that is going well. 
(Winnicott, 1964, p. 100) 
The question here is: might some of this strain alluded to by Winnicott not simply 
be an inevitable part of working with very ill patients (which to some extent it must 
be), but in addition be a consequence of the very assumptions and technique 
employed in the first place? Is the idea of ‘‘very detailed’’ adaptation to the 
patient’s needs more the product of a fantasy of the patient’s, or a construction of 
both patient and analyst, so that, in appearing to buy into it, the analyst in fact 
produces a state of expectation or entitlement in the mind of the patient, making 
the inevitable let-down all the more bitter and hateful (Balint, 1968, p. 116)? And 
so might the lapses and holidays in vigilance to which Winnicott refers be con- 
sidered, at least in part, to have been iatrogenically produced? 
A further problem is how to link the two parts of the session together. What 
Winnicott does illustrate is how, after a so-called regressive experience, it is very 
important that the patient is able to speak about what happened and make sense of 
it. But whereas in this second part of the session Winnicott’s position as analyst is 
clear, I find it much harder to know what to make of his role in the first part, 
where he claims to be providing, or failing to provide, the necessary therapeutic 
conditions for work to be done. So when he writes of his ‘disastrous mistake’ with 
his patient in not setting up the room in the way the patient needed, how are we to 
hear this? Winnicott sets great store by the inevitability, indeed necessity, of the 
analyst making mistakes, so that the patient can use this failure of the analyst in 
order to get in touch with anger concerning the original environmental failure 
(Winnicott, 1954a, p. 289; 1963b, p. 258).] In this sense, as Abram notes in her 
commentary on Winnicott’s concept of regression, the analyst’s failure is an ‘‘enact- 
ment’’, that is it ‘‘has to occur within the transference’’ (Abram, 1996, p. 257). 
But it is not clear to me that Winnicott sees his mistake in this way, as part of his 
relationship with the patient. He writes in the same paper, ‘‘although it was a 
narrow shave … it can easily be seen that one simply cannot afford to make these 
mistakes with patients who are more ill’’ (1964, p. 100), which seems to indicate 
very clearly that he simply feels he made a serious mistake in not arranging 
the room in the correct way, despite his careful checking, and that therefore he has 
to take some responsibility for the patient’s subsequent acting out. It is as though 
Winnicott is not quite sure how seriously or literally to take himself here. Writing 
of the work of Winnicott and his followers, Michael Balint refers to their ‘‘exalted 
sincerity’’, demonstrated in ‘‘a curious attitude of the analyst which – as reported 
in our scientific meetings and in the literature – strikes one as apologetic, conti- 
nuously confessing to mistakes and blunders, failures and shortcomings’’ (1968, 
p. 116). What I miss in his account is any sense of irony, that is, some openness to 
other perspectives which are opened up by a consideration of the transference, for 
instance, that some kind of folie deux is being played out here. 
I have also looked in the literature for an account of therapeutic regression which 
gives a sense not of how a single session might be conducted, as in the Winnicott 
 example, but of how the whole period of therapeutic regression might be seen in 
the context of the analytic treatment as a whole. The clearest example I have come 
across is one given by Masud Khan. In a particularly vivid and detailed account 
(which runs over about 30 pages) he describes the development and outcome of 
what he calls an ‘‘anaclitic regression’’ (Khan, 1960, p. 137) in the course of a 
three-year analysis. 
The patient came to analysis following a breakdown into a state of agitated 
depression. On one occasion, for example, she had been found wandering away 
from her home in a state of panic and confusion. In his account Masud Khan 
divides the analysis into several phases. He calls the first phase, which lasted 
about seven months, as running ‘‘a very smooth and classical course’’ (p. 144), 
in that the patient was able to make use of the analyst’s interpretations. This 
was followed by a period characterized by mania and elation, in which the 
patient contemptuously withdrew from her friends in the outside world, while at 
the same time investing the analysis with all her hopes of unlimited success. 
She adopted an omnipotent attitude, by reassessing all the experiences so far 
worked on in the analysis, feeling superior to them and creating a ‘‘new and 
unhistorical reality’’ of her own. 
After the first long break in the analysis the manic bouts were replaced by 
suicidally despairing sadness and grief, punctuated with intense rage against both 
her husband and her analyst. Following a cruel rejection by her husband, there 
followed what Masud Khan describes as ‘‘a collapse into sheer hopelessness’’,a 
state that was ‘‘no longer apathy or depression; it was just being nothing’’ 
(p. 154). 
This marked for the patient ‘‘a gradual and controlled regression to what the 
patient described as ‘a state of being nothing’ and the emergence from it’’ (p. 149). 
During this period, which lasted about three months, the patient almost gave up 
completely on trying to look after herself, and had to rely on support from friends 
and colleagues. At the same time the regression involved a ‘‘near-absolute’’ depen- 
dence on Masud Khan as the analyst, which at times he understood to mean help- 
ing the patient with some of her actual affairs, such as replying to letters from her 
husband. Masud Khan characterizes the outstanding feature of the regression as 
‘‘a total and abysmal sense of loss and letting herself experience this loss in all its 
aspects’’ (p. 156), although he notes that in some sessions during this period the 
patient would feel ‘‘quite normal’’ (p. 157). He conveys how allowing his patient’s 
experiences to affect him helped him be in touch with her. For example, on one 
occasion when talking of her thoughts of killing herself the patient ‘‘started to cry, 
quietly, gently, and with the whole of her body. I could feel its reality and pain in 
myself. There was nothing of her strength left, she felt; and this also I could feel’’ 
(p. 154). He describes his main role during this period as: 
to be there, alive, alert, embodied and vital, but not to impinge with any personal need to 
translate her affective experiences into their mental correlates … If I was not all there in my 
body-attention she would register it right away. 
(Khan, 1960, p. 157) 
This phase culminated in an overdose of sleeping pills, which then ushered in a 
period of recovery. However, following another rejection by her husband, the 
patient developed ‘a most resolute and paranoid state’, which lasted six months. 
 She now felt that the whole analysis had been a hoax, and that the analyst, hus- 
band and referring psychiatrist were conspiring against her. During this period 
Masud Khan had to struggle with a quite conscious fear that she would kill herself. 
But, by adopting a resolutely interpretive attitude, particularly concerning the 
patient’s murderous impulses towards those whom she loved, he helped the patient 
emerge from this paranoid state. The rest of the treatment, its final phase, ‘‘ran a 
smooth course’’, and after another four months the patient terminated the treat- 
ment, saying she had now ‘‘found a way of living my own life’’ (p. 166). 
Masud Khan presents this as an example of how the patient was helped by the 
analyst through a period of deep regression into making a good recovery from a 
very severe depression. However, even on its own terms, it is not clear why the so- 
called period of regression should be picked out as the critical or crucial part of 
the treatment. Indeed the whole analysis itself comes over as beset by enormous 
technical difficulties, as the patient seems to lurch from crisis to crisis, and oscillates 
between periods when she could be reached by the analyst and periods when she 
could not. For instance, the phase which comes shortly after the recovery from the 
regression, described as a resolutely paranoid phase with a constant background 
threat of suicide, seems to be no less disturbing and taxing for the analyst to find a 
way of responding to, no less challenging to the adequacy and adaptability of his 
technique, and no less critical a period to be managed if the analysis was not to 
founder at that point. Furthermore, other crucial phases of the analysis, particu- 
larly the ending, risk being glossed over as mere examples of ‘classical analysis’,as 
opposed to the more dramatic descriptions of the so-called phase of regression. 
The assumption that there is a special phase of a treatment or type of work 
where the normal considerations of analytic technique no longer apply leaves 
no place to consider how the two phases or types of work link up with each other. 
For instance, Masud Khan does not seem to wonder what it means that this 
so-called period of regression ended with a suicide attempt, and was followed by a 
period of paranoia in which the patient regarded the whole analysis as having been 
a hoax – whether these might represent an unconscious commentary by the patient 
on how she experienced the analyst’s conduct during the period of regression and 
his change-over to a more normal analytic technique in the subsequent phases of 
the analysis. 
What happens if one does away with the whole idea of a therapeutic regression 
in this case? In my view, what can then emerge is a more coherent and plausible 
clinical account, one which links all the phases of the analysis together as instances 
of a powerful and insistent manic-depressive cycle (Lucas, 1998). In Masud Khan’s 
account the manic parts of this cycle are already well described, for example, in the 
first part of the analysis when the patient re-assesses her therapy into her own ver- 
sion of the truth, or in the coldly superior paranoid phase. But now what Masud 
Khan describes as the period of regression would instead be seen as the emergence 
of the psychotically depressed part of the cycle. A similar reading of the so-called 
regressed state would be to cast it as a version of a ‘thin-skinned’ narcissistic state, 
as a counterpoint to the ‘thick-skinned’ manic and paranoid states, characterized 
by the patient seeking to manage a devastating puncture of self-regard brought 
about by the rejections by her husband (and, in the transference, by the analyst?) 
by adopting a self-pitying attitude of ‘‘continually abasing himself, looking for 
agreement and denying difference’’ (Bateman, 1998, p. 15). 
 Discussion and concluding remarks 
In a detailed critique of (mainly North American) writings on regression, Inderbit- 
zin and Levy argue that they rely on a concrete and outmoded model of develop- 
ment, which consists of ‘‘attempts to find states of mind in the past paralleling 
current, unexplained, adult states of mind, and then utilizing the past to explain 
the present by fixation or regression’’ (2000, p. 215). The problem, they say, with 
such a simplistic view is that it diverts attention from what might be going on in 
the patient’s mind. I think this is borne out in both of these examples. When 
recounting his patient’s ‘‘extreme reaction’’ to the ‘‘catastrophe’’ of the changed 
set-up of the consulting room, Winnicott has nothing to say of his understanding 
of her state of mind at this point, the assumption being that she is in some sense 
re-living a past experience of having been traumatically let down. For Masud Khan 
there is also little to explore once he has decided that his patient is in a severely 
regressed state of mind, which for him seems to mean a kind of experiental point 
zero. But if one were to recast such experiences not as examples of severe regression 
and therefore beyond further analytic description, but as experiences amenable to 
analytic understanding, for instance, as states of aggrieved and / or abject depres- 
sion, they then become open to exploration as to how they have arisen, how they 
may link to other states of mind exemplified by the patient (e.g. periods of manic 
flight or omnipotence), and also what they may indicate about the prevailing state 
of the transference (e.g. the patient’s rage or hopelessness about feeling misunder- 
stood by the analyst). One might then wonder whether the analyst’s assumption of 
almost total responsibility for the patient in these examples is more to do with the 
projection by the patient of the capacity to think and act into the analyst, a projec- 
tion all the more powerful when suicide is a prominent feature (Bateman, 1998; 
Gabbard, 2003), which can then put enormous pressure on the analyst to see a very 
ill or traumatized patient as requiring special treatment (Gabbard, 1986). This 
neglect of the operation of ordinary projection and transference is a consequence 
of the analyst construing the clinical space as an exclusively dyadic one: 
For Freud there are three people, one of them excluded from the analytic room. If there are 
only two people involved then there has been a regression of the patient in the analytic set- 
ting, and the setting represents the mother with her technique, and the patient is an infant. 
(Winnicott, 1954a, p. 286) 
The problem is that this blots out the triangular or oedipal space within which ana- 
lytic thinking and self-observation can take place (Britton, 1989, pp. 86–7). 
These accounts appear one-sided in another sense, in that they rely on explicit 
appeals to the analyst’s authority and knowledge – he just knows, or ought to 
know that the patient is in a severely regressed state, and what the patient then 
‘needs’ the analyst to do in order to manage such a state of affairs. This way of 
thinking is at odds with what Gabbard and Drew, in their contemporary review of 
the concept of therapeutic action, characterize as a key feature of contemporary 
psychoanalytic practice: ‘‘the negotiation process that takes place in each analytic 
dyad’’ (2003, p. 825). The assumption when it comes to these cases of so-called 
severe regression is that no such negotiation is possible – the analyst either accepts 
the regression, or finds ways of avoiding or short-circuiting it. Looking at these 
examples in terms of the negotiation process offers a different and, in my view, a 
 more informative perspective. In Winnicott’s example, I would argue that what was 
really therapeutic was how he enabled the patient to negotiate her experience of 
having been let down by Winnicott rather than, as Winnicott has it, his ability to 
foster his patient’s regression. In Masud Khan’s example, it is the significant inabil- 
ity or refusal of the patient to allow a negotiation process which comes over as the 
most salient feature of the analysis, a perspective which is obscured by bringing in 
the idea of the patient needing a sustained period of regression in the analysis. 
The conclusion one might then come to is that the concept of therapeutic regres- 
sion is simply too ambiguous, too laden down with outmoded associations and 
ideas, too compromised to form the basis for a clinical strategy, and so no longer 
worth its place in psychoanalytic thinking. This is where I have come to in my own 
thinking. The fundamental problem with therapeutic regression as a concept is that 
it is essentially a reactive concept, dependent on a certain view of classical tech- 
nique to which it serves as a challenge. Historically it has played a part, perhaps a 
significant part, in what in the 1950s and 1960s were called in America the ‘‘widen- 
ing scope discussions’’ (Dreher, 2000, p. 124), that is, debates amongst psycho- 
analytic practitioners of how to respond to the more personality-disordered types 
of patients that were starting to come forward for treatment, and who did not 
respond well to the way psychoanalysis was practised at the time (Rey, 1994, p. 8). 
Balint, for example, writing in 1968 refers to his position, as an advocate of 
regression, as being on the fringe of a ‘‘classical massive centre’’ (1968, p. 155). 
However, this classical massive centre has now given way to what Gabbard and 
Drew describe as ‘‘a pluralism unknown in any prior area’’ (2003, p. 825). As a 
consequence the very notion of a standard or ordinary analytic technique has now 
been considerably widened. 
Furthermore, what were once novel and radical ideas concerning therapeutic 
regression have now been incorporated into more modern concepts and clinical 
strategies. A good example is the distinction between interpretations aiming at con- 
veying understanding, and those that aim to give the patient an experience of being 
understood. Writing of the patient who appears to hate any idea of the meaningful 
contact involved in being understood by the analyst, Steiner comments that the 
patient still ‘‘needs the analyst to register what is happening and to have his situ- 
ation and his predicament recognized’’ (1993, p. 132, italics added), using language 
that seems to me to embody much of what is meant by therapeutic regression. 
For these reasons it is not surprising that many contemporary reviews of psycho- 
analytic technique make no mention of the therapeutic use of regression – the 
concept is not mentioned in Gabbard and Drew’s paper, for instance. 
Nevertheless a case can still be made for there being something of value in these 
clinical accounts. What they succeed in illustrating, in a particularly compelling 
way, are some of the consequences of taking to the limit one of the basic assump- 
tions, or implicit meanings (Dreher, 2000, p. 169) that underpins and animates the 
whole idea of therapeutic regression. This is the idea that analysts should strive to 
model themselves on the image of a devoted and nurturing mother holding or con- 
taining her helpless and dependent infant. It is a model that clearly inspires Masud 
Khan’s description of how he saw it as part of his role to take over some of the 
care-taking functions while his patient was in the full swing of her regression. 
A variant of this image is what Henri Rey (1994) called a ‘brick mother’, that is, a 
practitioner striving to attain the solidity and reliability of a substance, such as one 
 of the four elements (Balint, 1968, p. 69). This is how Winnicott sometimes seems 
to conceive of himself. In his close attention to the location of the objects in his 
consulting room it is as though Winnicott thought of the setting as an extension of 
his body, and so endowed it with a physical presence which would literally hold his 
patient. In another description of a session with a regressed patient, Winnicott 
describes how he knew he must remain absolutely still, ‘‘scarcely breathing’’,as 
though he felt he had to approach the consistency of a solid object (1954a, p. 290). 
While the extensive reliance in analytic thinking on the concepts of holding and 
containment testifies to the productiveness of this maternal metaphor, there is a 
danger when this metaphor becomes the exclusive one. Other metaphors – for 
example, the image of an oedipal mother, that is, a figure tied to a structure which 
opens out onto a horizon of other people, ideas and institutions, or a way of think- 
ing based on the fundamental asymmetry between patient and analyst (Baranger 
et al., 1983, p. 1) – then become devalued or pushed out of the frame. Further- 
more, perhaps as a consequence of an over-reliance on one model, there is a 
tendency towards concrete thinking (Inderbitzin and Levy, 2000, p. 271), of taking 
the metaphor literally: ‘‘in the extreme case the therapist would need to go to 
the patient and actively present good mothering’’ (Winnicott, 1954a, p. 282). 
The problem is not only one of the conflation here of the symbolic and the literal. 
It is also to do with a particular feature of the maternal metaphor itself as a 
sustaining image for a therapist, which is that it does not allow the analyst any 
subjectivity of their own. It is a construction made entirely from the infant’s 
supposed point of view. The term ‘mother’ here is not a person, and has no 
existence other than as a function for the infant (Baraitser, 2007). 
However, it could also be argued that it is the very refusal of such an attitude to 
fit into more contemporary ways of thinking about analysis that gives it its value. It 
is clear that for many writers, even if the more worked-out version of regression as 
in the idea of therapeutic regression remains problematic, there is still life in the con- 
cept of regression itself, and that the loss of such a concept through any form of 
‘‘concept-reflecting discourse’’, that is, a discourse that examines concepts as to their 
adequacy and meaningfulness (Dreher, 2000, p. 165), would outweigh any possible 
benefits. In its evocative sense the idea of psychoanalysis being uniquely concerned 
with the primitive still strikes a chord, as in Bion’s aphorism: ‘‘Winnicott says 
patients need to regress: Melanie Klein says they must not regress; I say they are 
regressed’’ (quoted in Britton, 1998, p. 71) And when used in a clinically focused 
way to signal the value of non-intervention in some clinical situations, one can still 
find examples in the literature which use the idea of regression as a way of calling 
up the analyst’s creativity and imagination in responding to difficult clinical situa- 
tions, whether it be a state of extreme withdrawal (White, 2006b, pp. 20–2), finding 
a way of speaking directly to the psychotic part of the patient (Bromberg, 1991, 
p. 417), or used as a way of drawing attention to the uniquely personal part of the 
countertransference (Coen, 2000). One can even find arguments for the clinical value 
of the idea of regression turning up in unexpected places (Britton, 1998, pp. 70–81). 
It is true that, like Inderbitzin and Levy (2000, p. 220), I have come to a more 
radical position, finding not only the concept of therapeutic regression but the 
more generic term ‘regression’ itself too empty of meaning to be useful. Whenever 
I now encounter the word ‘regression’, or the term ‘regressed patient’, I find I have 
to do a quick bit of mental translation: which form of regression is meant, to what 
 and from what does the writer mean to welcome this development or not, and what 
is the writer trying to get at by introducing the term? Nevertheless, as Dreher 
reminds us, it is part of the very ‘‘liveliness’’ of psychoanalysis that none of its 
basic concepts command consensus amongst practitioners about what they actually 
mean (2000, p. 164). What matters is not only the conceptual clarity of a concept, 
but also how far clinicians can engage with it and use it to extend their thinking, 
and many psychoanalytic writers continue to invoke the idea of regression. And 
even if the concept of therapeutic regression, which transforms the more generic 
notion of regression into a more worked-out and substantial clinical concept, now 
seems outmoded and of dubious clinical value, an investigation of its usefulness 
can still provoke questions as to what is really therapeutic in our work. 
Translations of summary 
Gibt es in der Psychoanalyse noch einen Platz fu¨ r das Konzept der ‘‘therapeutischen Regression’’? Als 
Grundlage seiner Untersuchung der Bedeutung und N tzlichkeit des Konzepts der therapeutischen Regression dient 
dem Autor die eigene Ratlosigkeit ob der Frage, wo dieses Konzept in seinem klinischen Denken und in seiner Praxis 
einen Platz finden kçnnte. Er trifft eine Unterscheidung zwischen drei Bedeutungen, in denen der Begriff ‘‘Regression’’ 
im psychoanalytischen Diskurs benutzt wird: als Mçglichkeit, eine primitive Ebene des Erlebens zu bezeichnen, als 
Erinnerung daran, dass dem Verzicht auf Interventionen in bestimmten klinischen Situationen ein hoher Wert 
zukommt, und als Beschreibung einer Phase in der analytischen Behandlung mancher Patienten, in der der Analytiker 
die normale analytische Technik beiseite lassen muss, um eine Regression des Patienten zu unterst tzten. In ebendieser 
dritten Bedeutung als ‘‘therapeutische Regression’’ wird der Begriff im vorliegenden Beitrag untersucht, und zwar vor 
allem in Form einer ausf hrlichen Diskussion zweier klinischer Beispiele f r so genannte therapeutische Regressionen, 
die von Winnicott bzw. von Masud Khan stammen. Der Autor vertritt die Ansicht, dass der klinische Prozess durch 
die Einf hrung des Konzepts der therapeutischen Regression in diesen Beispielen eher verdunkelt als gekl rt wird. 
Er zieht den Schluss, dass das Konzept als klinisches Konzept nicht l nger hilfreich ist. Er weist jedoch auch darauf 
hin, dass viele psychoanalytische Autoren weiterhin eine Verwendung f r das eher generische Konzept der Regression 
haben und dass die Auseinandersetzung mit dem spezifischeren Konzept der therapeutischen Regression insofern 
wertvoll ist, als sie zu Fragen nach dem, was in der psychoanalytischen Behandlung tats chlich therapeutisch wirkt, 
anregt. 
¿Sigue habiendo lugar para el concepto de ‘regresio´ n terape´utica’ en el psicoana´lisis? El autor aprove- 
cha su propia imposibilidad de hallar un lugar para la idea de regresi n terap utica en su pensamiento cl nico o en 
su pr ctica como base para una investigaci n de su significado y utilidad. Distingue tres usos del t rmino ‘regre- 
si n’ en el discurso psicoanal tico: como la manera de evocar un nivel primitivo de experiencia; como un recorda- 
torio en algunas situaciones cl nicas del valor de la no-intervenci n por parte del analista; y como la descripci n 
de una fase de tratamiento anal tico con algunos pacientes donde el analista necesita poner de lado la t cnica ana- 
l tica normal a fin de fomentar una regresi n en el paciente. Esta tercera acepci n, a la que el autor denomina 
‘regresi n terap utica’ es la que este art culo examina, sobre todo mediante una amplia discusi n de dos ejemplos 
cl nicos de pacientes que hacen la denominada regresi n terap utica, uno brindado por Winnicott y el otro por 
Masud Khan. El autor argumenta que en estos ejemplos la introducci n del concepto de regresi n terap utica m s 
bien oscurece en vez de clarificar el proceso cl nico. El autor concluye que, como concepto sustancialmente cl nico, 
la idea de regresi n terap utica ha sobrevivido a su utilidad. Sin embargo seÇala que muchos autores psicoanal ti- 
cos contin an encontrando un uso para el concepto m s gen rico de regresi n, y que la propia aproximaci n a la 
idea m s particular de regresi n terap utica tiene el valor de provocar preguntas como ‘qu es lo que es realmente 
terap utico en el tratamiento psicoanal tico’. 
Existe-t-il encore une place pour le concept de « re´gression the´rapeutique » en psychanalyse? L’auteur 
part de son propre chec trouver une place pour l’id e de r gression th rapeutique dans sa pens e et sa pratique 
clinique pour en rechercher son sens et son utilit . Il distingue trois faÅons dont le terme « r gression » est utilis dans 
le discours psychanalytique : comme une faÅon d’ voquer un niveau primitif de v cu; comme un rappel, dans 
certaines situations cliniques, de la valeur de non-intervention de la part de l’analyste; et comme une description 
d’une phase du traitement analytique de certains patients o l’analyste est dans la n cessit de mettre de c t la tech- 
nique analytique normale pour encourager la r gression chez le patient. C’est ce troisi me sens, que l’auteur nomme 
« r gression th rapeutique », qui est tudi ici, au moyen d’une discussion approfondie autour de deux exemples clin- 
iques de patients traversant ce qui a t appel une r gression th rapeutique, l’un issu de l’oeuvre de Winnicott, 
l’autre de celle de Masud Khan. L’auteur soutient que dans ces exemples, l’introduction du concept de r gression 
th rapeutique obscurcit plut t qu’elle n’ claire le processus clinique. Il conclut que, en tant que concept clinique 
 substantiel, l’id e de la r gression th rapeutique a surv cu son utilit . Cependant il note galement que de nom- 
breux auteurs psychanalystes utilisent encore le concept g n rique de r gression, et que ce r el engagement pour l’id e 
particuli re de r gression a le m rite de susciter des questions sur ce qui est r ellement th rapeutique dans le traite- 
ment psychanalytique. 
Il concetto di ‘regressione terapeutica’ ha ancora un posto in psicoanalisi? L’autore muove dalla sua 
esperienza di non essere riuscito a dare il giusto spazio al concetto di regressione terapeutica nella sua teorizza- 
zione e prassi clinica per esplorare il significato e la validit di tale concetto. Propone nel suo studio tre accezioni 
del termine ‘regressione’ nel discorso psicoanalitico: pu essere un modo di evocare un livello primitivo dell’esper- 
ienza; o un termine inteso a ricordare in alcune situazioni analitiche l’utilit di una tecnica di non-intervento da 
parte dell’analista; oppure la descrizione di una fase del trattamento analitico di alcuni casi in cui l’analista deve 
mettere da parte la normale tecnica analitica al fine di incoraggiare una regressione del paziente. ð questa terza 
accezione del termine, definita dall’autore ‘regressione terapeutica’, che questo lavoro intende esaminare, principal- 
mente mediante un’estesa discussione di due esempi clinici di cosiddetta ‘regressione terapeutica’, uno descritto da 
Winnicott e l’altro da Masud Khan. L’autore sostiene che in questi esempi l’introduzione della nozione di regres- 
sione terapeutica, offuschi, piuttosto che chiarire, questo concetto clinico. L’autore conclude che, attualmente, 
questo concetto non riscontri pi successo come strumento psicoanalitico. Egli nota tuttavia che molti autori di 
psicoanalisi continuano ad usare il termine nella sua accezione pi generica, mentre la discussione sul sopracitato 
concetto di regressione terapeutica ha una validit intrinseca in quanto solleva la questione di cosa sia realmente 
terapeutico nel trattamento psicoanalitico. 
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